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SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

On October 26, 2010, Defendant-Movant Allen Johnson filed a motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 claiming that the United States Supreme Court's decision in *Skilling v. United States*, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 177 L. Ed. 2d 619 (2010), which limited the reach of "honest services" fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1346 to "fraudulent schemes to deprive another of honest services through bribes or kickbacks supplied by a third party who had not been deceived," *id.* at 2928, rendered the conduct to which he pleaded guilty no longer criminal. *See* Mot. at 2. The government filed its opposition on December 3, 2010; Johnson filed his reply on January 7, 2011; and the matter has been under submission to the Court for the past two and one-half years. On April 15, 2013, the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion in *United States v. Garrido*, 713 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2013), which, as discussed below, is directly on point to the issues in this case.

In *Garrido*, the defendants Robles and Garrido were convicted following a jury trial of multiple counts of "honest services" fraud. *Id.* at 988. While on appeal, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in *Skilling* which, in the words of the Ninth Circuit, "narrowed the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 1346 to include only honest services fraud based on bribery and kickback schemes" and "prohibited prosecutions . . . based on a *failure to disclose a conflict of interest* as unconstitutionally vague." *Id.* (citing *Skilling*, 130 S. Ct. at 2932-33). Although the indictment and jury instructions encompassed a bribery and kickback scheme, *id.* at 996, and the evidence supported the conviction under this theory, *id.* at 997, the court found plain error "because the . . . instructions permitted the jury to convict . . . on *Skilling's* now unconstitutional failure to disclose theory" *Id.* at 995. The court also reversed Robles' money laundering convictions which required proof of a "monetary transaction in criminally derived property," noting that the indictment alleged that the "criminally derived property" was money derived from Robles' honest services fraud . . . [and] because

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the § 1346 honest services convictions were constitutionally defective under Skilling, so too were the [money laundering] convictions." *Id.* at 998-99.

In light of Garrido's interpretation of Skilling, there is no reasonable dispute that the conduct to which Johnson pleaded guilty is no longer criminal. The indictment in *Garrido* "could be read to at least imply a bribery or kickback scheme." Id. at 996; see also id. at 989 n.1 (indictment alleged that co-schemer received over \$2 million from city contracts and, in turn, paid over \$1.4 million to Robles' family and friends). The jury instructions in Garrido referred to bribery and kickbacks as "example[s] of schemes that could amount to honest services fraud " *Id.* at 996. The evidence in *Garrido* supported a conviction under and bribery or kickback theory as a co-schemer testified that Robles instructed him to funnel more than half the proceeds from a municipal contract to Robles' relative, id. at 997, and the Ninth Circuit found sufficient evidence to affirm Robles' conviction on five bribery counts based on this conduct, id. at 999-1002. Nonetheless, the court reversed the defendants' honest services fraud convictions after concluding that there was a "reasonable probability that the jury convicted [them] of honest services fraud based on their failure to disclose a conflict of interest," id. at 995-96, and acquitted the defendants of the honest services fraud counts where it was undisputed that the theory under which they were convicted was an undisclosed self-dealing theory, id. at 999.

In this case, Johnson pleaded guilty to six counts of honest services fraud based on a theory that, in acting as a closing agent for home purchase and equity loans, he defrauded lenders (to whom he had a fiduciary obligation) of their right to his honest services by disbursing loan proceeds to the loan originator (i.e., codefendant Kenneth Ketner) rather than directly to the borrower while also paying the loan originator a portion of the fees he received as the closing agent and disguising these payments. See Memo. of P.&A. at 2-4 (filed Aug. 25, 2010). Johnson was never charged with and never admitted to defrauding lenders to whom

he had a fiduciary obligation of their right to his honest services by accepting a bribe or kickback. See Indictment (Ex. A to Mot.) at 1-2, 9-17; Plea Agreement (Ex. B to Mot.) at 4-7; Transcript of Guilty Plea Hearing (Ex. C to Mot.) at 22-30. As there has never been any allegation or admission that Johnson defrauded lenders of their right to his honest services by accepting a bribe or kickback, the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Garrido provides additional authority for Johnson's claim that the conduct underlying his conviction is not the type of bribery or kickback scheme to which Skilling narrowed the scope of honest services fraud. Garrido also supports Johnson's claim that his money laundering conspiracy conviction should be vacated because the monetary transactions contemplated by the conspiracy to which he pleaded guilty did not involve criminally-derived property. Respectfully Submitted,

Dated: June 10, 2013

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The indictment's allegation that Johnson "provided a portion of the closing fee to defendant KETNER as a kickback," Indictment (Ex. A to Mot.) at 11, ¶ 16(h), is not sufficient for a post-*Skilling* honest services fraud charge because there was no allegation that Ketner had a fiduciary duty to the victim lenders. *See United States v. Milovnovic*, 678 F.3d 713, 722-24 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (*Skilling* requires breach of fiduciary-type duty as element of "honest services" fraud); *see also* Reply at 10-11.